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The Role of Simmelian 
Friendship Ties on 
Retaliation within  
Triads
Kenneth T. Goh1, David Krackhardt2,  
Laurie R. Weingart2, and Tat Koon Koh3
Abstract
We examine the effect of friendship in triads on retaliatory responses 
to unfair outcomes that originate from a group member. Drawing on 
Simmel’s classic discussion of relationships in social triads versus dyads, we 
hypothesized that the effect of unfairness on retaliation between friends is 
stronger when the third party in the triad is a mutual friend, rather than a 
stranger. We also draw on social categorization theory to hypothesize that 
the effect of unfairness on retaliation between strangers is stronger when 
the third party is a friend of that stranger than when the triad consists of 
all strangers. Hypotheses were tested in an experiment where participants 
negotiated with one another in a three-person exchange network. The 
results supported our hypothesis that between friends, the increase in 
retaliation was stronger following an unfair deal when third parties were 
mutual friends, rather than strangers.
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Effect of Friendship Ties on Retaliatory Responses 
to Unfair Treatment in Triads
In the workplace, experiences of unfairness can lead to retaliatory behaviors 
such as lawsuits (Bies & Tyler, 1993), strikes (Leung, Chiu, & Au, 1993), 
theft (Greenberg, 2002), sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002), 
verbal abuse (Robinson & Bennett, 1995), and revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1996; 
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). In addition to these overt attack reactions, retalia-
tion can also occur more covertly as withdrawal reactions such as reducing 
prosocial behaviors (Jermier, Knights, & Nord, 1994; Moorman, 1991; 
Niehoff & Moorman, 1993), work performance (Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 
1990), and ostracism (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Sommer, 
Williams, Ciarocco, & Baumeister, 2001). In both cases, the goals of retalia-
tion are to restore the victim’s self-esteem or to educate the offender in 
response to injustices experienced (Miller, 2001). These retaliatory acts can 
also be considered a form of counterproductive work behaviors (Folger & 
Skarlicki, 2005). Not only do these acts create emotional distress in the short 
term, but they can also have long-lasting and adverse consequences on the 
targets of retaliation.
Given the consequences of retaliatory behaviors, researchers have exam-
ined antecedents of retaliation such as the type of resource loss experienced 
(Donnenwerth & Foa, 1974), treatment by authority figures (Smith, Tyler, 
Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998) and the degree of psychological identification with 
the group (De Cremer, 2006). A related stream of research in the justice lit-
erature examines antecedents of counterproductive behaviors that go against 
the legitimate interests of an individual or organization (Gruys & Sackett, 
2003; Sackett & DeVore, 2001). Prior research has conceptualized anteced-
ents of these behaviors primarily in terms of the generalized tendencies of 
individuals to engage in such behaviors (e.g., Dalal, 2005; Fox & Spector, 
2005). More recently, there have been calls for more research that examines 
relational antecedents of these behaviors (Aquino & Lamertz, 2004; Glomb 
& Liao, 2003; Hershcovis & Barling, 2010; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & 
Schroeder, 2005) because people also behave differently depending on who 
they interact with (Hershcovis & Barling, 2007; Hubbard, Dodge, Cillessen, 
Coie, & Schwartz, 2001). Furthermore, to the extent that these behaviors are 
directed at another individual, the interpersonal nature of these behaviors 
underscores the need to look beyond individual variables to relational ones 
(Bowler & Brass, 2006). In response to these calls, researchers have studied 
how relational characteristics between actors and recipients such as power, 
gender, race (Fox & Spector, 2005), the degree of liking (Venkataramani & 
Dalal, 2007), and third-party relations (Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998) affect 
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the propensity of these behaviors, as well as the underlying social compari-
son process between the situational context and these behaviors (Lam, Van 
der Vegt, Walter, & Huang, 2011). This research extends this literature by 
examining how friendship and the configuration of friendship ties in the 
group affect counterproductive behavior expressed as retaliatory responses to 
unfair outcomes.
Friendship is prevalent in the social life of organizations (Berman, West, 
& Richter, 2002) and researchers have generally found friendship to be a 
positive influence on group processes, behaviors, and outcomes (e.g., Jehn & 
Shah, 1997; Shah & Jehn, 1993; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Given this 
emphasis on the positive influence of friendship, it is not surprising that scant 
attention has been paid to its effects on dysfunctional behavior, such as retali-
ation. Addressing this question is relevant to scholarship on social relations 
and counterproductive behaviors because it potentially highlights some of the 
negative effects of friendship in organizations. Although retaliation between 
friends is not typically observable because it may manifest more subtly in the 
form of withdrawal reactions, it can have far-reaching negative consequences 
that extend beyond the individual, to harm the group and organization.
In this research, we consider relational characteristics between actors in 
terms of their direct friendship with one another, as well as their friendship 
with a third party. Third-party friendships are examined to account for the 
social context in work groups which are pervasive in organizations (Cohen & 
Bailey, 1997; Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford, & Melner, 1999; Kozlowski 
& Bell, 2003). In work groups, friendship ties among members are likely to 
vary because interdependence and interactions are imposed by workflow 
arrangements rather than who likes whom (Labianca et al., 1998). This is in 
contrast to social groups which are more likely to be comprised of all friends 
because they tend to be formed by people who are similar to one another 
(Brewer, 1979; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998) and people can leave the group if they feel 
“different.” In light of this heterogeneity, it is important to explicitly account 
for characteristics of the social context in the group rather than treat it as a 
factor to be controlled away (Bamberger, 2008; Hegtvedt, 2005; Johns, 2006).
In addition to extending research on the relational antecedents of counter-
productive behaviors, this research also makes a contribution to the justice 
and group literatures. Examining how the configuration of friendship ties in 
groups affects retaliation to unfair outcomes addresses calls for more research 
into the role of the group in the justice literature (Hegtvedt, 2005). Moreover, 
it extends the social network perspective of justice research (Shapiro, Brass, 
& Labianca, 2008) by examining how network configurations affect people’s 
response to unfair treatment. The findings from this research can also 
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contribute to research on small groups by developing and testing theory about 
how the relational composition can affect group behavior. Group composi-
tion is of keen interest to group researchers, and prior research has examined 
composition in terms of member attributes such as gender (Wittenbaum, 
Shulman, & Braz, 2010), ethnicity (Paletz, Peng, Erez, & Maslach, 2004), 
personality (Halfhill, Sundstrom, Lahner, Calderone, & Nielsen, 2005), and 
cognitive abilities (Woolley, Gerbasi, Chabris, Kosslyn, & Hackman, 2008). 
However, research on the effect of relational composition on group behavior 
is limited and this present work fills a gap that is considered to be important 
and practically relevant given the prevalence of work teams and the perva-
siveness of existing relationships in these teams.
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present our hypotheses about how different configurations 
of friendship ties in groups affect a victim’s retaliation in response to unfair-
ness. First, we explain the effect of the dyadic relationship between ego and 
alter1 on ego’s perception of and response to unfair outcomes from alter. We 
refer to this dyadic ego–alter relationship in the group as the primary tie in the 
triad. We then shift the focus from dyads to triads, and consider how the third 
party in the triad affects ego’s response to unfair outcomes from alters. This 
relationship between alters is referred to as the secondary tie in the triad. 
Triads are used as a starting point to study the social structures found in 
groups because they are the minimal size for group phenomena to manifest. 
Prior research suggests that the shift in how some group phenomena unfold is 
greatest between dyads and triads, and less so between triads and larger 
groups (Mills, 1958; Moreland, 2010; Moreland, Hogg, & Hains, 1994).
We develop our arguments for how the third party in the triad affects ego’s 
responses to unfair outcomes from alters by first considering the case when 
ego and alter are friends, then considering the case when both are strangers. 
In the first case where ego and alter are friends, we draw on Simmel’s (1950) 
treatise comparing social dyads with triads to explain how friendship in the 
secondary tie (i.e., between alters) affects differences in ego’s retaliation in 
response to unfair outcomes from alter. In the second case where ego and 
alter are strangers, we draw on social categorization theory to explain how 
friendship in the secondary tie affects differences in ego’s retaliation in 
response to unfair outcomes from alter.
These hypotheses are presented in the context of an experimental exchange 
paradigm where actors are connected to a network where they bargain with 
another for valued resources (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Molm & Cook, 1995). 
This paradigm was adopted because it provides a context within which 
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recurring instances of unfair treatment (in the form of agreements that benefit 
alter disproportionately more than ego) and retaliation (in the form of puni-
tive offers from ego to alter) between friends and strangers can occur.
Friendship and Retaliation
We define friendship as being characterized by three components: (a) fre-
quent interaction, (b) affection, and (c) history (Krackhardt, 1992). According 
to Krackhardt, friendship ties may be considered to be a type of “strong” tie 
(Granovetter, 1973), but the reverse is not true—a tie may be considered to 
be strong on any one of these dimensions, but friendship is a particular type 
of relationship that encompasses all three components. Although there can be 
qualitatively different kinds of friendships that vary on other dimensions 
(e.g., Ingram & Zou, 2008; Wright, 1984), we do not distinguish between 
types of friendship in this present research because of our broader emphasis 
on differences between friends and strangers.
Configuration of friendship ties in groups. In this research, we discuss four dis-
tinct social structures that can be distinguished along two dimensions: the 
primary tie between ego and alter, and the secondary tie between alters. The 
configuration of these friendship ties yields four different configurations of 
group social structure.
As shown in Figure 1, ego is assigned to Position A and the two alters to 
Positions B and C. Although additional configurations can be included by 
varying a third dimension—the relationship between ego and the third 
party—we do not do so because balance theory (Heider, 1958) suggests that 
these configurations are less common than the four configurations that we 
consider here.2
Because the primary focal point is the ego–alter tie, ego–alter ties in each 
structure are labeled to represent distinct configurations of friendship ties in 
a triad. In triads where both primary ego–alter ties and secondary alter–alter 
ties consist of strangers, ego–alter ties are labeled SILOS ties. SILOS is an 
acronym for the phrase “strangers in a land of strangers,” inspired by the 
novel Stranger in a Strange Land (Heinlein, 1961). In triads where ego and 
alter are friends (i.e., the tie is symmetric3), but both are not friends with the 
third party, ego–alter ties are labeled as Sole-Symmetric ties (see Krackhardt, 
1998, 1999). The use of the label sole here highlights the fact that there is 
only one symmetric friendship tie in the triad. Conversely, ego–alter ties in 
triads where both alters are friends and neither are friends with ego are labeled 
Outcast ties because ego is an outsider in the triad. Finally, ego–alter ties in 
triads consisting of mutual friends are labeled Simmelian ties, in 
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acknowledgment of Simmel’s (1950) distinction between dyadic ties that are 
embedded in social cliques and those that are isolated. These configurations 
are shown in Figure 1, where lines between actors denote friendship ties.
Effect of friendships in primary ties on retaliation. People value exchange out-
comes at both an instrumental and symbolic level (Ekeh, 1974; Haas & 
Deseran, 1981; Kelley, 1986; Polzer, Neale, & Glenn, 1993). The instrumental 
level refers to the utilitarian benefit that people receive from the exchange, 
whereas the symbolic level refers to the information conveyed about the other 
party’s relational intent and orientation. The symbolic value of exchange out-
comes is evident from the indignant responses of people who experience unfa-
vorable outcomes (e.g., lower than expected salary offers) because it threatens 
their prestige or status more so than their purchasing power (Berger, Zelditch, 
Anderson, & Cohen, 1972; Homans, 1976). Prior studies have also consistently 
found that people distribute resources equally when the other party is a friend, 
even when it is costly for them to do so. By the actors showing their willingness 
to sacrifice personal short-term monetary gain, this politeness ritual (Mikula & 
Schwinger, 1978) is symbolic in that it conveys trustworthiness and the inten-
tion to maintain a nonexploitative, long-term relationship with the partner. In 
Figure 1. Social structural configuration of friendship ties in triads.
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addition, symbolism attached to voluntary acts of reciprocity can lead recipi-
ents to develop sentiments of trust, affective regard and relational solidarity 
toward their exchange partners (Molm, Schaefer, & Collett, 2007).
Because the symbolic value of exchange outcomes pertains to relational 
information, exchanges between friends are likely to contain symbolic con-
tent that reflect the existing relationship between them; exchanges between 
strangers, however, are not likely to contain the same symbolic content. 
Consequently, unfair outcomes will be experienced more negatively by ego 
when alter is a friend rather than a stranger, because ego will experience a 
loss in value at both the instrumental and symbolic levels. In contrast, unfair 
outcomes will be experienced less negatively if alter is a stranger, because 
ego only experiences a loss in value at the instrumental level. Hence, in both 
cases, an unfair outcome will increase the likelihood that ego will retaliate in 
response, but this increased likelihood will be stronger when alter is a friend 
rather than a stranger.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between an unfair outcome 
to ego and retaliation by ego.
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between an unfair outcome to ego and 
retaliation by ego is moderated by friendship, such that the increased like-
lihood of retaliation by ego following an unfair outcome is higher when 
alter is a friend rather than a stranger.
Effect of friendship in secondary ties on retaliation between friends. We next 
broaden our focus from the dyadic relationship to consider the broader social 
structure in which the dyad is embedded, and how this may affect responses 
to unfair treatment. The basis of our argument draws on Simmel’s (1950) idea 
that friendships that are embedded within a social clique (i.e., a pair of friends 
who share common friends) are qualitatively different from those that exist in 
isolation. According to Krackhardt (1998), the difference between Simmelian 
and non-Simmelian ties is not one of strength or intensity (i.e., they are not 
better friends) but rather, one of “quality, dynamics, and of stability” (Krack-
hardt, 1998, p. 23). In isolated dyads, actors retain a greater sense of individu-
ality because each actor can sever the tie by withdrawing from the relationship. 
Individuals in Simmelian ties, however, have less leverage in disrupting the 
group because the group can persist with two other members even if one actor 
chooses to leave. With lower leverage, Simmelian-tied individuals would 
subordinate their individual interests to collective interests. Evidence of this 
was found by Krackhardt (1998) who showed that Simmelian friendship ties 
were more stable than non-Simmelian ties in a college living group com-
posed of 17 undergraduates over a 15-week period.
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The subordination of individual interests to the collective interests among 
Simmelian-tied individuals increases the salience of the group’s identity. 
With the increased salience of group identity, Simmelian-tied actors become 
more sensitive to information about their standing in the group (Lind & Tyler, 
1988). This sensitivity stems from people’s predisposition to belong to social 
groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) as a way to reduce subjective uncertainty 
about their place in the social world (Hogg, Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004) 
and maintain self-esteem (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Thus, in comparison 
with an actor who is Sole-Symmetrically tied, one who is Simmelian-tied 
will be more sensitive to information about his or her standing in the group, 
and is also more likely to interpret exchange outcomes as suggestive of his or 
her standing with respect to the friend and to the group. In other words, the 
symbolic value of exchange outcomes perceived by ego will be greater if 
they are Simmelian-tied than if they are Sole-Symmetrically tied. Compared 
with receiving a fair outcome, the negative experience of receiving an unfair 
outcome will therefore be experienced more negatively by Simmelian-tied 
actors than actors in Sole-Symmetric ties. Consequently, the positive rela-
tionship between retaliation by ego following the receipt of an unfair out-
come from alter will be stronger when ego’s tie to alter is Simmelian rather 
than Sole-Symmetric.
Effect of friendship in secondary ties on retaliation between strangers. We next 
consider differences in retaliation across social structural configurations in 
which ego and alter are strangers. This occurs in SILOS ties (where group 
members are strangers) and in Outcast ties (where both alters are friends, but 
strangers to ego). We proposed earlier that ego is more likely to retaliate in 
response to unfair outcomes when the perpetrator is a friend rather than a 
stranger because ego experiences a loss in both instrumental and symbolic 
value when unfair outcomes are perpetrated by a friend. Thus, in comparing 
the interactions between ego and alter in SILOS and Outcast ties, where there 
are no differences in the symbolic value of exchange outcomes (because 
alters are strangers in both cases), a different framework needs to be applied. 
Specifically, we draw on social categorization theory to explain the effect of 
third-party ties on retaliation by ego because the friendship ties between 
alters in Outcast ties make social categorical differences between ego and 
alter more salient.
The salient social categorical differences between ego and alter in Outcast 
compared with SILOS ties contributes to ego’s perception of being in a numeri-
cal minority position. Being a numerical minority contributes to feelings of 
insecurity and vulnerability (Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 
1992; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; Simon & Brown, 1987) which heighten ego’s 
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sensitivity to the evaluations and potential constraints imposed by others (Fiske, 
1993; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Furthermore, being the outsider in the group 
also increases the salience of ego’s self-concept when they are in Outcast ties, 
which raises ego’s concerns about justice (Sedikides, Hart, & De Cremer, 
2008). This is supported by prior research that has found that people think 
about justice when they imagine that an unfair outcome has happened to them 
rather than to someone else (Ham & van den Bos, 2008). In addition, Brebels, 
De Cremer, and Sedikides (2008) found that heightened accessibility of the self 
produced stronger retaliation against the source of unfair treatment because 
people are averse to the loss of self-esteem (Baumeister, 1993; Baumeister, 
Smart, & Boden, 1996), which can cause “a depressing revision of self-
appraisal” (Baumeister et al., 1996, p. 13). These findings suggest that ego will 
feel more insecure and be more sensitive to justice concerns in Outcast ties than 
in SILOS ties. Ego will therefore experience unfair outcomes from alter more 
negatively in Outcast ties compared with SILOS ties. The greater negativity 
experienced by ego in Outcast ties results in a stronger desire to retaliate as a 
way to protect their self-esteem. We thus predict that the positive relationship 
between ego’s retaliation in response to an unfair outcome will be stronger in 
Outcast ties compared with SILOS ties.
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between an unfair outcome to ego and 
retaliation by ego is moderated by the configuration of friendship ties in 
the group. Specifically,
Hypothesis 3a: The increased likelihood of retaliation by ego following 
an unfair outcome is higher when the tie between ego and alter is 
Simmelian rather than Sole-Symmetric.
Hypothesis 3b: The increased likelihood of retaliation by ego following 
an unfair outcome is higher when the tie between ego and alter are Outcast 
rather than SILOS.
Method
Simulating Exchange in Triads
To simulate recurring opportunities for unfair treatment and retaliation, an 
experimental exchange paradigm was adopted. In this paradigm, participants 
in the experiment are connected to one another in a network where they 
engage in multiple rounds of bargaining with their partner(s) for valued 
resources (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Molm & Cook, 1995).
Triads were organized as a three-person exchange network consisting of 
two producers of complementary resources (i.e., bread or butter), and a 
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broker who profits by linking exchanges between both producers (Burt, 1992; 
Simmel, 1950). In this study, ego is a resource producer who exchanges 
directly with alter, the broker in the network. The third party, the secondary 
alter, produces the complementary resource. The actors in this network were 
positively connected, in the sense that a transaction between the broker and 
one producer enables the broker to transact with the other producer 
(Yamagishi, Gillmore, & Cook, 1988). A negatively connected network, in 
contrast, is one where a transaction between the broker and one producer 
precludes the broker from transacting with the other producer (e.g., Cook & 
Emerson, 1978).
Exchanges in these triads were structured in this manner for three reasons. 
First, such exchanges simulated key features of work groups. Scholars (e.g., 
Hackman, 1987; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Salas, 
Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007) acknowledge these features to include 
(a) differentiated roles and responsibilities, (b) shared goals, and (c) task inter-
dependence. Although these features do not exhaustively define work groups 
in organizations, they adequately distinguish these triads from groups of indi-
viduals acting independently of one another in an experimental setting.
In this exchange network, participants adopted clearly differentiated roles 
as either a producer or a broker. Although participants were required to bar-
gain with one another, they also shared a common goal of reaching an agree-
ment because the reward system was structured such that no points were 
gained by the group if anyone reached an impasse with his or her partner. The 
final characteristic of work groups, interdependence, was engendered by 
structuring the rules of exchange such that the potential terms of exchange 
that the broker could make with one producer was contingent on the deal 
reached with the other producer.
The second reason for structuring the triad in this form was that brokerage 
relations are common in work groups. Consider the example of cross-func-
tional product development teams. In these teams, members with differenti-
ated functional skills collaborate on projects with idiosyncratic requirements 
and ambiguous outcomes. On these tasks, prior routines for coordination and 
task accomplishment can become obsolete quickly, requiring team members 
to regularly negotiate coordination procedures, roles and responsibilities, 
task specifications, project resources and deadlines. These negotiations are 
likely to be mediated by a project manager who, acting as a broker, maintains 
harmonious relations among team members and increases the odds of arriv-
ing at outcomes that are optimal for the project team.
The third reason was that friends typically treat one another fairly in an 
experimental setting (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Polzer 
et al., 1993). As we were interested in how they responded to unfair 
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treatment, it was crucial that the unfair treatment was seen as legitimate by 
the perpetrator to induce them to treat a friend unfairly. This was achieved in 
the study by creating an imbalanced power structure in favor of the broker 
(Burt, 1992, 2004; Fernandez-Mateo, 2007; Fernandez & Gould, 1994; 
Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Podolny & Baron, 1997), so that brokers could dic-
tate exchange terms that were to their benefit at the expense of their 
partner’s.
Task
This broker-mediated exchange network is a variation of the exchange net-
works implemented by other scholars to study such phenomena as power 
(e.g., Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi, 1983), trust (e.g., Molm, 
Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000), reciprocity (e.g., Molm, Quist, & Wiseley, 
1993), and procedural justice (e.g., Molm, Peterson, & Takahashi, 2003). The 
exchange task involved a multiple-round negotiation through a computer net-
work between producers and the broker over the terms of exchange. In each 
round, each producer was endowed with four units of a given resource (either 
bread or butter). Producers earned points based on the number of bread and 
butter pairs they had at the end of each round. Brokers earned points by 
extracting a commission from the units of bread or butter that passed between 
the two producers.
In each triad, producers could only negotiate with the broker, and not with 
one another. Within each round, producers could make multiple offers to the 
broker at any time, and vice versa, as long as an offer had not been accepted 
by their partner. An offer represented the number of units of resource one was 
willing to give to his or her partner, and the number of units of the comple-
mentary resource the person wanted to receive from his or her partner.
The range of offers that resource producers could make (to either give or 
receive units) varied between one and three. The most advantageous offer 
from the bread producer’s perspective would be one where that producer 
offered to give one unit of bread in exchange for three units of butter. The 
same can be said for the butter’s producer for units of bread.
For brokers, the units of resources that they could exchange with one party 
were limited by the units of that same resource they had received from the 
other party for that round. Thus, if a broker received two units of bread from 
A, he or she would only be able to give a maximum of two units of bread to 
C. Brokers were thus motivated to ensure that they received enough resources 
from both producers so that they had enough to exchange with the other party 
and still retain a residual amount for themselves to earn points. In the event 
that this rule was violated (e.g., if the broker agreed to give three units of 
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bread to the butter producer after receiving only one unit of bread from the 
bread producer), the deal was negated. Untraded units of bread and butter 
expired at the end of each round and were not carried forward to future 
rounds.
The rules of exchange thus meant that an impasse with one producer 
would prohibit the broker from transacting with the other producer, because 
no resources could then be exchanged. Hence, outcome interdependence 
between actors was high because the broker had to reach an agreement with 
both producers for any exchange to occur.
Excluding impasses, there were a total of nine possible offers that resource 
producers could make. We use the label OFFERx,y, where x and y are between 
1 and 3, to denote offers in which the producer offered to give x units of 
resource produced in exchange for y units of the complementary resource. 
These possible offers and the potential payoff to producers and brokers are 
shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 1 shows that a producer would 
earn 1 point if OFFER1,1 was accepted by his or her partner, the broker. In 
Table 2, the left column shows offers made by one producer; offers made by 
the other producer are shown in the top row. Table 2 shows that if the broker 
accepted OFFER1,1 from the first producer, then he or she will only have the 
option of accepting three possible offers from the second producer—
OFFER1,1, OFFER2,1, and OFFER3,1. Accepting each of these offers from the 
second producer, having accepted OFFER1,1 from the first, will yield zero, 
one and two points, respectively.
Participants bargained with their partners through networked computers. 
The user interface enabled participants to make and accept offers from their 
exchange partners in real-time. In addition, the interface also provided infor-
mation about their partner’s counter-offers, the history of past deals made, 
Table 1. Payoff to Producers If Offer Is Accepted.
Offers by producer Payoff
1. OFFER1,1 1
2. OFFER1,2 2
3. OFFER1,3 3
4. OFFER2,1 1
5. OFFER2,2 2
6. OFFER2,3 2
7. OFFER3,1 1
8. OFFER3,2 1
9. OFFER3,3 2
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cumulative points, and the points scored in the prior round. Participants thus 
had information about their own scores, but not their partners’ scores, 
although they could make estimates based on the amount that they exchanged 
with their partner.
Participants
A total of 99 participants in 33 same-sex triads were recruited from the gen-
eral population surrounding a mid-Atlantic university in the United States. Of 
these 33 triads, 16 were all-male groups and 17 were all-female groups. 
31.3% of the participants described themselves as Caucasian, 54.6% as 
Asian, and the remaining 14.1% as belonging to another ethnic group. In the 
recruitment materials, participants were invited to attend the study either 
alone, or with one or two other friends, for pay. A total of 44, 22, and 33 par-
ticipants completed the experiment individually, in dyads, and in triads, 
respectively.4 The pay included a base amount of US$10 and an additional 
amount based on their performance during the study.
Procedure
Participants were recruited through three separate ads—one recruiting indi-
vidual participants, another recruiting pairs of friends, and a third recruiting 
trios of friends. For each session, there were no more than two groups run-
ning concurrently. In sessions where two groups were run concurrently, par-
ticipants who attended the session individually and as a pair of friends were 
Table 2. Matrix of Payoff to Broker as a Function of Offers by Producers If Offer 
Is Accepted.
Offers by producer (butter)
Offers by producer (bread) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. OFFER1,1 0 1 2  
2. OFFER1,2 0 1  
3. OFFER1,3 0  
4. OFFER2,1 1 0 2 1 3 2  
5. OFFER2,2 1 0 2 1  
6. OFFER2,3 1 0  
7. OFFER3,1 2 1 0 3 2 1 4 3 2
8. OFFER3,2 2 1 0 3 2 1
9. OFFER3,3 2 1 0
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randomly assigned to a group. Participants who attended as a trio of friends 
were kept as an intact group. In all conditions, participants were randomly 
assigned roles in their groups.
Upon arrival, participants were briefed about the task and then led to dif-
ferent rooms, depending on the roles to which they were randomly assigned. 
To limit communication between exchange partners, producers were situated 
in different rooms from brokers. In each room, participants sat at a computer 
terminal with their backs to one another so that monitors could not be seen by 
other participants and verbal communication was prohibited.
Once all participants had arrived, participants received a set of generic 
task instructions and role-specific instructions for the exchange task. The 
generic instructions provided information about the exchange network; the 
role-specific instructions provided information about using the computer 
interface and earning points on the task.
After participants read the instructions, groups began a guided-practice 
phase, where each person could use the interface to bargain with their partner 
in real-time. The identities of exchange partners were not revealed on the 
interface, so partners remained anonymous during this phase. The objective 
of the guided-practice phase was to ensure that participants were familiar 
with the scoring system, as well as with using the interface to bargain with 
their partners. These sessions were actively monitored by experimenters to 
ensure that familiarity with the interface was attained. The duration of the 
practice phase was typically 30 min.
In the actual bargaining phase, the names of exchange partners were 
revealed on the interface. Groups completed at least 40 rounds of bargaining 
and were given a time limit of 50 s per round. The round ended when the 
broker reached an agreement with both producers or after 50 s had passed. 
Participants were not told how many rounds they had to complete.
At the end of the exchange task, participants were asked to complete a 
survey about their relationships with their exchange partner, their perceived 
power in the task, and demographic information. Once this survey was com-
pleted, participants were paid, debriefed, and thanked for their participation.
Measures
Retaliatory offer. The dependent variable in our model is a binary variable that 
captures the occurrence of OFFER1,3 made by ego across each dyadic tie at 
time t. We consider such offers to be indicative of retaliation because 
OFFER1,3 were highly disadvantageous to brokers as they only received a 
single unit of resource, which had to be exchanged with their second produc-
ers, leaving them with no units. Consequently, brokers’ expected earnings 
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from accepting OFFER1,3 were zero (see Table 2), and producers were aware 
that their partner had no incentive to accept such offers. In light of its punitive 
nature, an OFFER1,3 can therefore be considered as retaliation, especially 
when it was preceded by an unfair outcome to the producer in the previous 
round (see the following sections).
Deal outcomes. We coded the outcomes of deals in round t − 1 as DEALx,y, 
where x is the units of resource that producers agreed to give to their brokers, 
and y is the complementary resource that producers agreed to receive in return.
Amongst all the possible deal outcomes, DEAL3,1 was the most unfair one 
to producers because it involved the most number of units producers could 
give and the least they could receive. Such deals resulted in the worst possi-
ble payoff to producers, while giving their partner (the broker) the best pay-
off. The highly unequal payoff from accepting DEAL3,1 therefore contributes 
to ego’s overall sense of unfair treatment by their partner (Ambrose & 
Arnaud, 2005; Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001) because people do not always 
worry about whether there are multiple types of injustice (e.g., distributive or 
procedural justice), but instead react to their general experience of injustice 
(Greenberg, 2001; Hauenstein, McGonigle, & Flinder, 2001; Leventhal, 
1980; Lind, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; Törnblom & Vermunt, 1999). Occurrences 
of DEAL3,1 were therefore considered as unfair treatment perpetrated by bro-
kers on producers.
Type of tie. The four types of ties were dummy-coded. An additional code 
was used to identify whether the ties consisted of friends or strangers at the 
dyadic level.
Control Variables
Experimental phase. To account for the possibility that producer’s responses 
to unfair outcomes with the broker would vary depending on how far the 
experiment had proceeded, the round number for each observation was 
recorded. The first 10 rounds were assigned to Phase 1, the next 10 rounds to 
Phase 2, and so on. Phase 1 was removed from the analysis because pilot tests 
suggested that participants took several rounds of real-time bargaining to get 
used to the conditions and the interface. The remaining phases were entered 
into the regression as Phase 2, Phase 3, and Phase 4.
Deal history. Deal history was accounted for by creating variables that 
accounted for the proportion of prior unfair (DEAL3,1), fair (DEAL3,3, 
DEAL2,2, DEAL1,1), and favorable deals (DEAL1,3) for each round.
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Relative power. Because perceived power may affect numerical minorities’ 
biases toward outgroup members (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991), we controlled 
for this effect by measuring the producer’s perceived power relative to the 
exchange partner’s (RELPOWER). RELPOWER was derived by aggregat-
ing the items that measured the producer’s perception of his or her power in 
the task at the end of the experimental session (“Please rate the power you 
had during the exercise,” “Please rate the control you had during the exer-
cise”) and the producer’s perception of his partner’s power in the task (“Please 
rate the power of your partner during the exercise,” “Please rate the control 
your partner had during the exercise”). We applied a log transformation to the 
ratio of these scores to normalize their distribution. The items measuring 
power showed high internal consistency (self-ratings α = .85, partner-ratings 
α = .97).
Sex. We included a variable to control for the sex of the group members, 
which was coded with a dummy variable (MALE; 0 = female, 1 = male).
Analysis
Since the bargaining rounds (Level 1) were nested within individual dyadic 
ties (Level 2), we used a multilevel logistic regression model to analyze the 
data using Stata (version 10). Logistic regression is appropriate because the 
dependent variable (OFFER1,3) is dichotomous (0 = absent, 1 = present). In 
our model specifications, RELPOWER and MALE are Level 2 variables, 
while the others are Level 1 variables. We removed disallowed deals—agree-
ments where the broker agreed to give more of a particular resource to one 
party than he or she received from the other (e.g., receiving one unit of bread, 
but agreeing to give three units of bread)—from the data so as not to create 
confound with impasses.
Our preliminary analysis showed that the inclusion of experimental phase 
and deal history did not improve model fit significantly more than the parsi-
monious model that excluded these variables, so these were removed from 
our final model.
Manipulation Check
Participants’ perception of the configuration of friendship ties in their group 
was assessed by measuring the strength of their relationship with their 
exchange partner (i.e., the primary tie), and a separate measure of their percep-
tion of their partner’s relationship with the third party (i.e., the secondary tie).
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The relational strength between ego and alter was measured using a 
20-item scale adapted from Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998) that both par-
ties completed. This measure included subscales for Scope, Common 
Interests, Trust, Affection, Alliance, Lack of Competitive Strain, Relationship 
Continuity Focus, Positive Exchange, Romantic Interest, and Relational 
Strength. Internal consistency for the scale was high (α = .93). The relational 
strength for each dyad was computed by aggregating responses to these items 
and averaging these scores between dyads. Aggregation was justified on the 
basis of satisfactory intraclass coefficients, ICC(1) = 0.93.
The first column in Table 3 shows the average relational strength in the 
ego–alter tie, reported by ego and alter. The results of the manipulation check 
show that the relational strength between ego and alter was lower for strang-
ers (M = 3.43) than for friends (M = 5.03), t(64) = −9.56, p < .01.
Ego’s perception of alter’s tie to the third party was measured with the 
item “They have a very close relationship” on a 7-point scale, 1 = strongly 
disagree and 7 = strongly agree (see Table 3, column 2). The results show that 
participants accurately perceived the composition of friends and strangers in 
the network, consistent with our manipulation. Ties in which alters were 
strangers (i.e., SILOS and Sole-Symmetric ties) were scored lower (M = 
3.37) than ties in which alters were friends (i.e., Outcast and Simmelian ties), 
M = 4.94, t(64) = −4.26, p < .01.
Results
Relative frequencies and means of the variables are presented in Table 4, 
while intercorrelations are presented in Table 5. At the round level of analy-
sis, there were 694 SILOS ties, 333 Outcast ties, 333 Sole-Symmetric ties, 
Table 3. Relational Strength of Primary Ties and Perceived Relationship of 
Secondary Ties by Ego.
Relational strength 
(primary tie)
Perceived relationship 
(secondary tie)
SILOS 3.31 3.67
Outcast 3.68 4.73
Sole-Symmetric 4.70 2.73
Simmelian 5.22 5.05
Note. Relational strength is the average relational strength score reported by ego and alter. 
Perceived relationship is based on ego’s perception of the secondary tie. For both scores, 
higher numbers reflect a stronger relationship.
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and 562 Simmelian ties. Across dyads, the deals that occurred most fre-
quently were impasses (28.1%), followed by DEAL2,2 (25.4%), and DEAL3,1 
(21.5%).
We present the six models that test our hypotheses in Table 6. Models 1 
and 2 tested the likelihood of retaliatory responses by ego as a function of 
their primary tie to alter (the broker). Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 tested the same 
dependent variable as a function of the social context, which takes into 
account both the primary tie between ego and alter, and the secondary tie 
between alters. Models 1, 3, and 5 include only the main effects of the inde-
pendent variables, with Sole-Symmetric ties as the referent factor in Model 3 
and SILOS ties as the referent factor in Model 5. Models 2, 4, and 6 include 
the DEAL3,1 × Tie interaction terms to test our hypotheses about the increased 
likelihood of retaliatory offers following an unfair outcome to ego in the pre-
vious round, with Sole-Symmetric ties as the referent factor in Model 4 and 
SILOS ties as the referent factor in Model 6.
Across all six models, the independent effect of DEAL1,3 on OFFER1,3 
was significant. This was expected because producers gained the most from 
DEAL1,3, and would naturally respond with OFFER1,3 in the hopes that their 
partner would repeat the same deal as before.
In support of Hypothesis 1, which predicted a higher likelihood of retalia-
tion from ego following an unfair outcome, DEAL3,1 was found to increase 
the likelihood of OFFER1,3 in Models 1, 3, and 5, β = .60, p < .05. The signifi-
cance of DEAL3,1 as a predictor of OFFER1,3 suggests that ego generally 
reacted negatively to DEAL3,1—these were unfair allocations where they 
earned the least points, but gave the most points to their partners. The results 
Table 4. Proportions of Deal Type by Ego–Alter Tie.
Total  
(N = 1,922)
SILOS  
(n = 694)
Outcast  
(n = 333)
Sole-Symmetric  
(n = 333)
Simmelian 
(n = 562)
OFFER1,3 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.10
DEAL3,1 0.22 0.14 0.31 0.18 0.29
DEAL2,1 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.07
DEAL3,2 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.15
DEAL1,1 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
DEAL2,2 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.18
DEAL3,3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
DEAL2,3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
DEAL1,2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
DEAL1,3 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Impasse 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.25
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also indicate that the occurrence of OFFER1,3 was not sensitive to the main 
effect of the configuration of friendship ties (see Models 3-6).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that friendship would moderate the relationship 
between the likelihood of retaliation from ego following an unfair outcome, 
such that the increased likelihood of retaliation by ego following an unfair out-
come is higher when alter is a friend rather than a stranger. As shown in Table 6, 
Model 2, the coefficient associated with the DEAL3,1 × Friend interaction was 
positive and significant, β = 1.25, one-tailed p = .01. Simple slopes for the 
relationship between DEAL3,1 and the likelihood of retaliation were tested for 
friends and strangers. The tests revealed that the likelihood of retaliation was 
significantly higher following DEAL3,1 for friends, β = 1.44, t(1905) = 4.20, 
p < .001, but not for strangers (Figure 2). Hypothesis 2 was thus supported.
Table 6. Logistic Regression Coefficients for the Independent and Interactive 
Effects of Deal Type and Tie Type on OFFER1,3.
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Log(RELPOWER) −1.42 (1.03) −1.50 (1.03) −1.53 (1.03) −1.68 (1.03) −1.53 (1.03) −1.68 (1.03)
Gender (male) 0.67 (0.59) 0.75 (0.59) 0.47 (0.63) 0.50 (0.63) 0.47 (0.63) 0.50 (0.63)
DEAL3,1 0.60* (0.29) −0.19 (0.45) 0.60* (0.29) 0.22 (0.58) 0.60* (0.29) −0.38 (0.63)
DEAL2,1 0.35 (0.31) 0.30 (0.31) 0.35 (0.31) 0.31 (0.31) 0.35 (0.31) 0.31 (0.31)
DEAL3,2 0.12 (0.37) 0.21 (0.37) 0.14 (0.37) 0.25 (0.37) 0.14 (0.37) 0.25 (0.37)
DEAL1,1 −0.59 (0.63) −0.64 (0.64) −0.59 (0.63) −0.64 (0.64) −0.59 (0.63) −0.65 (0.64)
DEAL2,2 −0.23 (0.25) −0.26 (0.25) −0.23 (0.25) −0.27 (0.25) −0.23 (0.25) −0.27 (0.25)
DEAL3,3 0.33 (1.20) 0.38 (1.22) 0.34 (1.20) 0.41 (1.22) 0.34 (1.20) 0.41 (1.22)
DEAL2,3 0.81 (1.04) 0.86 (1.04) 0.81 (1.04) 0.89 (1.05) 0.81 (1.04) 0.89 (1.05)
DEAL1,2 1.01 (0.96) 1.03 (0.96) 1.00 (0.96) 1.00 (0.96) 1.00 (0.96) 1.00 (0.96)
DEAL1,3 1.56* (0.70) 1.71* (0.71) 1.58* (0.70) 1.88** (0.72) 1.58* (0.70) 1.87** (0.72)
Friend 0.84 (0.60) 0.53 (0.61)  
DEAL3,1 × Frienda 1.25** (0.52)  
SILOS −1.42 (0.88) −1.34 (0.89)  
Outcast −1.22 (0.98) −1.10 (1.00) 0.20 (0.91) 0.25 (0.93)
Sole-Symmetric 1.42 (0.88) 1.34 (0.89)
Simmelian −.85 (0.90) −1.25 (0.91) 0.57 (0.75) 0.10 (0.77)
DEAL3,1 × SILOSa −0.60 (0.83)  
DEAL3,1 × 
Outcasta
−0.25 (0.81) 0.35 (0.84)
DEAL3,1 ×  
Sole-Symmetrica
0.60 (0.83)
DEAL3,1 × 
Simmeliana
1.22* (0.68) 1.82** (0.71)
Intercept −4.47** −4.36** −3.01** −2.98** −4.44** −4.33** (0.66)
Log likelihood −524.67 −521.74 −524.22 −519.47 −524.22 −519.47
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Simmelian ties were the referent category in Models 3 
and 4; SILOS ties were the referent category in Models 5 and 6.
ap values are one-tailed tests.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Hypothesis 3 predicted that the relationship between the increased likeli-
hood of retaliation from ego following an unfair outcome is moderated by the 
configuration of friendship ties in the group. According to Hypothesis 3a, the 
increased likelihood of retaliation by ego following an unfair outcome will be 
higher when the tie between ego and alter is Simmelian rather than Sole-
Symmetric. As shown in Model 4 in Table 6, the coefficient associated with 
DEAL3,1 × Simmelian ties, β = 1.22, one-tailed p < .05, with DEAL3,1 × Sole-
Symmetric ties as the referent, was significant and positive. Simple slopes for 
the relationship between DEAL3,1 and the likelihood of retaliation were tested 
for ties that were Simmelian and Sole-Symmetric. The tests revealed that the 
likelihood of retaliation was significantly higher following DEAL3,1 for 
Simmelian-tied friends, β = 1.44, t(1901) = 3.61, p < .001, but not for Sole-
Symmetric ties (Figure 3). Hypothesis 3a was thus supported.
Hypothesis 3b predicted that the increased likelihood of retaliation by ego 
following an unfair outcome will be higher when ego and alter are Outcast-
tied rather than SILOS-tied. Model 6 in Table 6 shows that the coefficient for 
the DEAL3,1 × Outcast interaction was in the expected direction but not sta-
tistically significant (β = 0.35, ns). Hypothesis 3b was thus not supported.
Discussion
Our findings contribute to theoretical development in the literatures on coun-
terproductive behavior, justice, and groups in the following ways. First, by 
examining retaliatory responses to unfair outcomes as a function of the con-
figuration of friendship ties in triads, this research adds to the growing body 
of work that has examined relational antecedents of counterproductive 
Figure 2. Interaction effects of an unfair deal and friendship on retaliation by ego.
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behaviors (e.g., Lam et al., 2011; Venkataramani & Dalal, 2007). Prior 
research has largely focused on relational characteristics at the dyadic level, 
whereas our research accounts for the group social context that dyads are 
embedded in by examining how different configurations of friendship ties in 
the group affect retaliatory responses to unfair outcomes. Specifically, our 
results show that the increased likelihood of retaliation following an unfair 
outcome was stronger when the perpetrator was a friend rather than a stranger. 
When the tie of a third party was taken into consideration, the increased like-
lihood of retaliation following an unfair outcome was stronger between 
friends when the third party was a mutual friend compared with when the 
third party was a stranger. This latter finding suggests that research into the 
relational antecedents of counterproductive behaviors should not be solely 
focused on dyadic relationships but should also include the broader social 
context that dyads are embedded in.
Second, support for the hypothesized mechanism by which social struc-
ture affects people’s propensity to retaliate to unfair outcomes extends the 
social network perspective of justice research (Shapiro et al., 2008) by intro-
ducing the idea of network configurations as a trigger of a group identity. 
Drawing on the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), we argued that 
individual interests are suppressed in favor of group interests when ego is 
Simmelian-tied (i.e., embedded within a clique of friends). The increased 
salience of the group identity causes ego to experience unfair outcomes more 
negatively, which leads to an increased likelihood of retaliation by ego in 
response to unfair outcomes. While network scholars are familiar with the 
Figure 3. Interaction effects of an unfair deal and tie-type on retaliation by ego.
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idea of social cliques, the social-psychological effects of being a member in 
these cliques and the corresponding effect on justice and counterproductive 
behaviors have rarely been integrated. Integrating these perspectives adds 
another dimension to how justice can be examined from a social networks 
perspective aside from the effect of networks configuration on social influ-
ence of justice perceptions (Shapiro et al., 2008; Umphress, Labianca, Brass, 
Kass, & Scholten, 2003).
Third, this research also contributes to the groups’ literature by highlight-
ing the effects that patterns of friendship have on group behavior. Although 
prior research has examined group composition in terms of the composition 
of individual attributes (Halfhill et al., 2005; Paletz et al., 2004; Wittenbaum 
et al., 2010; Woolley et al., 2008), research on the relational configuration of 
the group is lacking. It is reasonable to believe that tightly knit groups com-
posed of friends may have a performance advantage over other groups 
because of higher levels of prosocial behaviors, cooperation, and learning 
among other functional benefits (Jehn & Shah, 1997; Shah & Jehn, 1993; 
Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Our research finding raises a caveat by 
showing how the propensity for retaliatory, counterproductive behaviors can 
also be amplified in groups where members share close relational ties with 
one another if justice concerns are violated.
Our findings also have implications for practice. Because organizations 
have become dependent on groups as their primary work units (Cohen & 
Bailey, 1997; Devine et al., 1999; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003), this research also 
has organizational implications. Findings from prior research generally 
encourage the development of workplace friendships (e.g., Tse, Dasborough, 
& Ashkanasy, 2008), which is a view shared by managers (Berman et al., 
2002). Our findings highlight the risk inherent in this approach—people 
embedded in a dense network of friends are more sensitive to unfair treat-
ment. In the event that differential treatment of group members is required, 
those who feel that they have been unfairly treated may experience this more 
adversely and have a higher propensity to react negatively. The key implica-
tion of this research for practice is that as managers seek to develop friend-
ships among employees, particularly in the teams they manage, they should 
also be sensitive to the configuration of friendship ties in these teams because 
that can also affect people’s reactions to unfair treatment.
We did not find support for our hypothesis that among dyads consisting of 
strangers, the increased likelihood of retaliation by ego following an unfair 
outcome would be higher when the third party was a friend of alter (i.e., an 
Outcast tie), rather than a stranger (i.e., a SILOS tie). We hypothesized that 
this would occur because the perception of being a minority outgroup mem-
ber would be made salient in the Outcast condition (i.e., when both alters 
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were friends with one another, but not with ego). We consider two possible 
explanations for this lack of support. The first possibility is that social catego-
ries were not sufficiently salient in Outcast ties to make the “self” sufficiently 
accessible to motivate ego to engage in retaliatory actions toward alter fol-
lowing an unfair outcome. One finding that works against this explanation is 
that the manipulation check indicates that ego was more aware of the closer 
friendship between alters than between himself and alters. However, even if 
social categories were salient, it is also possible that the psychological effects 
of these differences were weakened by the high levels of interdependence 
between ego and alter. Interdependence has been found to increase prosocial 
behaviors, such as people’s willingness to cooperate, help, and share infor-
mation (Saavedra, Earley, & Van Dyne, 1993; Wageman, 1995). There is also 
evidence to show that task interdependence can moderate the harmful effects 
of faultlines on creativity (Nishii & Goncalo, 2008). Future research could 
examine this idea by decomposing the effects of interdependence from the 
psychological effects of social categorization.
The second possibility is that in spite of perceiving unfair outcomes as 
self-esteem threats, ego might have instead chosen to respond through alter-
native means such as social creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1985). 
Social creativity refers to the tendency to change the basis of comparison so 
that alter is perceived less favorably. If this is the case, we would then expect 
negative stereotypes of alter to be more salient to ego, and also for ego to 
demonstrate stronger evidence of psychological and behavioral withdrawal 
from the task. Future research could shed light on these possibilities by exam-
ining the effect of third-party relations on ego’s attitude toward alters and on 
ego’s level of task engagement.
A boundary condition of our findings is that these effects were found to be 
salient when contrasting ties between friends and strangers. As relationships 
are multifaceted, these effects may be altered when different dimensions of 
relationships are compared and contrasted. While a discussion of how the 
configuration of different dimensions of relationships in the group context 
can alter some of these behaviors is beyond the scope of this research, these 
questions should be examined in future research.
Limitations
A limitation of this study is that participants in the Simmelian condition were 
not randomly assigned to that condition. To do so, we would have needed to 
recruit at least three trios of friends for each session who were then randomly 
assigned to conditions. Unfortunately, we were unable to conduct the experi-
ment with three concurrent groups because of constraints in space and 
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Internet bandwidth for implementing the trading network. Randomly creat-
ing “friendship” among participants was also not an option because these 
artificially created bonds would have been conceptually different from the 
friendship ties described by Krackhardt (1992) which are characterized by 
frequent interaction, affection, and history. Therefore, systematic individual 
differences between those who participated as trios of friends and the rest of 
the sample population could not be ruled out. Despite this limitation in our 
design, we believe that the interpretation of our findings is still valid as we 
explain below.
The sample of participants who attended as trios of friends are likely to be 
biased toward higher levels of extraversion compared with the rest of the 
sample (Kalish & Robins, 2006). However, a higher level of extraversion 
among those in the Simmelian tie condition is an unlikely alternative expla-
nation for our findings. Extraversion has been found to be associated with 
positive mood (Rusting & Larsen, 1997), which suggests that Simmelian 
friends will be less prone to retaliate following the receipt of an unfair out-
come. This is contrary to our findings. Thus, even though we were unable to 
eliminate individual differences through randomization, this effect is likely to 
attenuate the predicted effect. We are therefore confident of our findings in 
spite of this limitation in our experimentation design. That being said, this 
issue could also be addressed in future research by measuring participants’ 
extraversion and other theoretically relevant individual differences.
Another limitation of this study is that we assumed OFFER1,3 to be retalia-
tory, but it is possible for participants to make OFFER1,3 for reasons that are 
different from this interpretation. An alternative interpretation is that instances 
where OFFER1,3 is made following DEAL3,1 represent attempts at reciproc-
ity. We believe that although OFFER1,3 is an exact reversal of DEAL3,1, there 
was a punitive intent on the part of the producer making OFFER1,3, because 
there is an intentional withholding of resources from his or her partner. As 
Table 2 shows, the broker’s acceptance of OFFER1,3 by either party reduces 
his or her expected earnings to zero. Because acceptance of OFFER1,3 is 
punitive to the broker, we believe that it is more likely that these offers are 
acts of retaliation by producers, rather than acts of reciprocity.
The generalizability of our findings to larger groups may also be limited. 
Not only may the strength of the proposed mechanisms vary in larger groups 
but intergroup effects from the formation of coalitions and subgroups could 
also enhance or interfere with these mechanisms. In addition, power and sta-
tus dynamics were controlled for in this study. But power and status are part 
and parcel of real-life groups, especially those in organizations. Research 
findings also indicate that power and status influence people’s perceptions of 
justice and revenge behaviors (Aquino & Thau, 2009; Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 
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2006). While controlling for these effects allowed us to isolate the effect of 
social structure in this study, future work could explicitly examine how power 
and status relations interact with social structure to extend the generalizabil-
ity of our findings to real world groups.
Conclusion
Even considering the above limitations, our findings suggest that the configu-
ration of friendship ties in a group, above and beyond the effects of friendship 
at the dyadic level, can influence behavior. We found that the increased likeli-
hood of retaliation following an unfair outcome against friends was stronger 
when third parties are mutual friends, rather than strangers. A broader impli-
cation of our findings is that future research on the relational antecedents of 
behaviors and attitudes, especially in the context of groups, should go beyond 
the dyad to also account for the configuration of ties that the dyad is embed-
ded in.
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Notes
1. In this article, we refer to ego as the focal person and alter as the other members 
in the group.
2. The other possible configurations of friendship ties are where B and C are friends 
with A, but not with one another; where A and C are friends with B but not 
friends with one another; where A and B are friends with C but not friends with 
one another; and finally where A and C are friends but not friends with B.
3. In contrast, an asymmetric tie is one where the friendship tie is not reciprocated 
by the other party—that is, ego considers alter a friend but alter does not consider 
ego to be a friend.
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4. Note that participants who attended with a friend were not automatically 
assigned to the Sole-Symmetric condition, but could have also been assigned to 
the SILOS and Outcast conditions.
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